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This paper considers a probabilistic duopoly in which products are described by their speciﬁc
attributes, this form of diﬀerentiation embodying the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Consumers
make discrete choices and follow a random decision rule based on these attributes. A three-stage game
is studied in which ﬁrms develop new attributes for their products (innovation), then may imitate
the attributes of the competing product and ﬁnally compete in price. At the equilibrium, the ﬁrm
selling the less appreciated product is generally incited to imitate its rival. Confronted to a threat
of imitation, the benchmark ﬁrm sometimes decreases strategically its attribute index in order to
diminish its unit cost of innovation and the diﬀerentiation on the market, deterring the imitation
in this way. This strategy is eﬃcient when imitation costs are suﬃciently concave. In the opposite
case, it is preferable for the benchmark ﬁrm to accept the imitation. Thus, according to the shape of
imitation costs, equilibria with “deterrence” or with “accommodation” occur, completing the current
typology of strategic responses to a threat of imitation.
Jel classification: D11, D43, L13.
Keywords: quality choices, diﬀerentiation by attributes, product innovation, product imitation.
1 Introduction
Endowing a product with new attributes or copying the attributes from a competing product are
very widespread practices on diﬀerentiated products markets. The ﬁrm selling a benchmark product is
frequently the ﬁrst target of copycats, as in the following examples. At the beginning of the 17th century,
Venetian cloths were reputed for their very high quality. Hampered by a technological lag, North European
producers decided to imitate these clothes in a very cunning way: “The chief stratagem of cloth smugglers
was to imitate typical Venetian signs and marks on the head and the selvage of the bolt. These signs were
supposed to guarantee the quality and origin of the cloth. (...) Another modus operandi was for foreign
manufacturers to weave Venetian-style woolens of inferior or mixed wools.” (Rapp, 1975, p 508). Such a
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1behaviour can also be observed more recently. The Caterpillar company, a heavy earth-moving equipment
manufacturer selling benchmark products on its market, faced similar diﬃculties at the beginning of the
1980’s: “The powerful Komatsu, once an upstart Japanese heavy equipment manufacturer, eventually
overtook rival Caterpillar by benchmarking its machines and ﬁnding ways to produce equivalent quality
at a fraction of the cost” (Miller, 1990, p 201). These examples show that the growth of rising ﬁrms is
often triggered by a partial imitation of a benchmark rival, forcing this incumbent to carry more attention
to its costs. The threat of imitation also aﬀects ﬁrms’ choices of product innovation: for example, the
incumbent may limit its R & D expenses, which seem to it unproductive.
This paper proposes a new framework for the analysis of interactions between product innovation and
imitation. Consumer’s beahviour is described by a probabilistic discrete choice model based on product
attributes and consistent with a Selection By Aspects (Restle, 1961) or an Elimination By Aspects
(Tversky, 1972). In this duopoly framework, the diﬀerentiation by attributes (or “DBA”) embodies the
standard horizontal and vertical forms of diﬀerentiation. Innovation is represented by the addition of
new speciﬁc attributes to a given product and imitation by the cancellation of some speciﬁc attributes
belonging to a competing product. Existence and properties of a perfect equilibrium in pure strategies
are analyzed in a three-stage game with innovation, imitation and price competition.
Whereas initial works of Gilbert and Newberry (1982) and Benoit (1985) were devoted to process
imitations, the combined analysis of product innovation and imitation with price competition is more
recent. Such a work is carried out by Pepall and Richards (1994) and Pepall (1997) in a duopoly with
diﬀerentiation by qualities (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). But this framework is not very well ﬁtted
to deal with imitation choices. Indeed, when the market is covered, the two ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase with
the quality gap between products, which represents the degree of diﬀerentiation. Thus, the high-quality
ﬁrm is always incited to increase its quality. But even a costless quality improvement, which is a form of
imitation, is not proﬁtable for the low-quality ﬁrm because products become closer substitutes.
The two papers previously mentioned employ slightly modiﬁed structures in order to avoid these
restrictions. Pepall and Richards (1994) study a Stackelberg duopoly with sequential pre-determined entry
and introduce the possibility of an exogenous imitation. In the model, the entrant has the opportunity to
pay a ﬁxed cost (depending on the quality gap) to make a perfect copy of the innovator’s product. The
authors highlight an interesting strategic eﬀect: the incumbent may increase its innovation level in order
to rise the imitation ﬁxed cost beard by the entrant, thus deterring the imitation. Pepall (1997) considers
a similar model with sequential entry but the entrant can now determine the imitation size endogenously.
However, it is also assumed that a quality increase performed by the low-quality ﬁrm reduces its ﬁxed
cost.1 At the equilibrium, the entrant decides either not to imitate the rival’s product or to achieve a
partial imitation.
Using a DBA duopoly provides additional insights to analyze interactions between innovation and
imitation. On the one hand, when vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiations are taken into account, each
ﬁrm can innovate and imitate the competing product. The imitation level is chosen in an endogenous way
1This assumption seems stronger than the simple assertion according to which the imitation cost is lower than the









































1and ﬁrms can adjust their innovation eﬀort to deter an imitation. On the other hand, strategic incentives
can be analyzed with endogenous unit costs whereas the current literature generally considers ﬁxed costs.
The study of the three-stage game with innovation, imitation and price competition leads to the
following new results. At ﬁrst, the imitation can improve the attractiveness of the recipient product
but also reduce diﬀerentiation on the market. In the DBA duopoly, an imitation is only proﬁtable for
the ﬁrm selling the less appreciated product if is possesses a relative cost advantage, as in the examples
mentioned at the very beginning. Then, equilibrium properties depend on the shape of the imitation
cost. When this cost is either null, or positive and concave, the ﬁrm selling the most appreciated product
deters completely the imitation by reducing strategically its attribute index. This setting describes a
“deterrence” equilibrium. When the imitation cost is strongly convex, a small imitation is realized and it
is more proﬁtable for the suﬀering ﬁrm not to react at all: this result characterizes an “accommodation”
equilibrium. Finally, when the imitation cost is weakly convex, a deterrence or a mixed equilibrium (in
which imitation is partially accepted and partially deterred) may be observed.
This paper is organized in the following way. The demand system of the DBA duopoly and forms
of diﬀerentiation it embodies are presented in Section 2. Section 3 recalls the existence conditions for
a perfect Nash equilibrium in the duopoly with innovative choice of attributes and price competition.
Section 4 studies ﬁrms’ incentives to imitate and demonstrates the existence of a perfect equilibrium in
the three-stage game with innovation, imitation and price competition. Properties highlighted at the
equilibrium are detailed in Section 5, leading to the taxonomy of “deterrence” and “accommodation”.
Conclusions are presented in Section 6 and proofs of several propositions are relegated in Appendixes.
2 Demand system of the DBA model
This section presents the choice probabilities of the DBA model. Then, forms of diﬀerentiation
described by the corresponding demand system are analyzed.
2.1 Choice probabilities
Consider a market in which two diﬀerentiated products are available, each consumer purchasing exactly
one unit of one product. It is supposed that consumers follow a probabilistic reasoning based on products’
attributes, such that their behaviour can be described by a random decision rule model. The model
employed here is called “Diﬀerentiation By Attributes” because products are diﬀerentiated according to
the speciﬁc attributes they possess, an approach remembering that of Lancaster (1966). This model is
formally equivalent to the structures with Selection By Aspects (Restle, 1961) and with Elimination By
Aspects (Tversky, 1972), these two models being themselves identical when only two options are taken
into account.
According to the conclusions of Payne and Bettman (2001), using such decision rules is time-saving
for consumers because the decision making does not require a complete listening of all the attributes. As









































1structure to describe small purchase decisions locking up a low amount of income (see also Batsell and
Seetharaman, 2005). Indeed, it is simply unlikely that consumers make a complete examination of all the
characteristics and of all the products in such a context. It is especially true for supermarket shopping
because consumers make several small decisions in a reduced time. The DBA model is also relevant when
a particular attribute triggers the purchase. The brand name seems to play such a role in the examples
mentioned in introduction.
In this model, speciﬁc non-price attributes of product i, with i = f1;2g, provide consumers with a
utility ui. These agents do not take into account the attributes shared by the products because they are
useless for the decision-making. As models with diﬀerentiation by attributes were primarily concerned
with discrete attributes, the introduction of a continuous variable (for example the price pi) remained an
open question until the paper of Rotondo (1986). This author suggests representing a price diﬀerence as
a speciﬁc attribute of the least expensive product. Consequently, the probability Pi of selecting product
i rather than product j depends on the price hierarchy:









uj + pi ¡ pj
ui + uj + pi ¡ pj
(2.1)




ui + pj ¡ pi





ui + uj + pj ¡ pi
(2.2)
The numerator of the probabilities represents all the speciﬁc attributes of the product considered. For
example, if pi ¸ pj, good i has only non-price speciﬁc attributes providing the utility ui, but if pj ¸ pi,
good i also possesses a price attribute, the price gap pj ¡ pi. The denominator represents all the speciﬁc
attributes of the two products. In a set of homogeneous goods (ui = uj = 0), the least expensive good is
always selected. When prices are identical, choice probabilities simply equal the utility index ratio, as in
the Luce model (1959).
These probabilities can be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways. In the spirit of Restle, Pi is the probability
of choosing product i because it possesses a speciﬁc attribute. For example, a speciﬁc brand name may be
chosen immediately by a consumer without considering other attributes. Following Tversky, Pi may also
represent the probability of eliminating j after having selected a speciﬁc attribute of i as the elimination
criterion.2 For example, all the products not possessing a “fair trade” label may be eliminated by an
ethical consumer.
2.2 Forms of diﬀerentiation
Consider now a market in which N consumers follow a probabilistic reasoning based on attributes: N
is supposed suﬃciently high so that the expected demand functions are simply taken as eﬀective by risk-
neutral ﬁrms. Observation of choice probabilities shows that demand functions Xi = NPi and Xj = NPj









































1are piecewise deﬁned. Note that demand functions possess a kink in pi = pj when ui 6= uj but this kink




u1 + u2 + p1 ¡ p2
(2.3)
X2 =
N(u2 + p1 ¡ p2)
u1 + u2 + p1 ¡ p2
(2.4)
Properties of the demand system are studied with more details by Laurent (2007a). In particular, it is
shown that the form of diﬀerentiation on the market depends on the values of utility variables.
Horizontal diﬀerentiation. Product diﬀerentiation is said purely horizontal in a duopoly framework when
market shares equal Pi = Pj = 1=2 for diﬀerentiated products sold at identical prices. This setting is
observed in the DBA model when u1 = u2 > 0: the speciﬁc attributes of the two products are appreci-
ated in the same way into the population of consumers and each agent chooses its preferred variety. This
particular case of the DBA model is formally equivalent to a Quadratic Address Model (d’Aspremont et
al., 1979) in which consumers’ density of preferences into the space of varieties is not uniform.4
Vertical diﬀerentiation. Diﬀerentiation is said purely vertical in the duopoly when market shares equal
Pi = 1 and Pj = 0 for identical prices. In this framework, there exists a preference hierarchy between
products. These proportions are obtained in the DBA model when u1 > 0 and u2 = 0. In this case, one
of the products is strictly preferred by the consumers because it possesses all the speciﬁc attributes on
the market. The existence of heterogeneous qualities can be integrated in the DBA model as a particular
form of vertical diﬀerentiation. The method used for prices integration is also applied for qualities: the
quality diﬀerence is simply a speciﬁc attribute of the high-quality good. When products are diﬀerentiated
by their only qualities, utility variables become u1 = q1 ¡q2 and u2 = 0 (the minimum level of quality q2








q1 ¡ q2 + p1 ¡ p2
(2.6)
This particular case of the DBA model is formally equivalent to a duopoly with diﬀerentiation by qualities
(Tirole, 1988) when a speciﬁc non-uniform distribution of consumers’ preference intensity for quality is
3It will be demonstrated in Proposition 1 that equilibrium prices actually satisfy the condition p1 ¸ p2.
4More precisely, the density linking the two structures is symmetric and reaches its maximum at the middle of the










































Horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation. When product diﬀerentiation is horizontal and vertical, the market
share of the most appreciated product belongs to the interval ]1=2;1[ and that of its competitor to ]0;1=2[.
For u1 > u2 > 0, choice probabilities are given by P1 = u1=(u1 +u2) > 1=2 and P2 = u1=(u1 +u2) < 1=2
when prices are identical. Diﬀerentiation is horizontal up to the level u2, the speciﬁc attributes of
the two products providing the same utility, and vertical for a level u1 ¡ u2, product 1 also oﬀering
additional attributes. In the DBA model, utility indices integrate many characteristics of diﬀerentiation
in a simple and endogenous way. This framework is not identical to deterministic multi-dimensional
structures (Neven and Thisse, 1990; Economides, 1993; Irmen and Thisse, 1998): these demand systems
are often more complex and only embody a limited number of characteristics, given a priori. In these
structures, the equilibrium analysis can not be carried out when no characteristic is “dominant” whereas
the DBA model is not aﬀected by this limitation. The DBA duopoly is also not equivalent to a binomial
logit with heterogeneous qualities: indeed, the logit cannot convey the case of pure vertical diﬀerentiation
(the DBA model is more general in this sense).
3 Perfect equilibrium with innovation and price competition
This section recalls existence conditions for a perfect equilibrium in a two-stage game with choice of
new attributes and price competition.
3.1 Nash price equilibrium
Existence and uniqueness of a Nash price equilibrium in pure strategies is studied in the DBA model.
Each ﬁrm i bears a unit cost ci, a ﬁxed cost Fi and its proﬁt is given by ¦i = (pi ¡ ci)Xi ¡ Fi.
Proposition 1 (Laurent, 2007a, p 15) There exists a Nash price equilibrium verifying pi ¸ pj,
with i;j 2 f1;2g and i 6= j, if and only if:
ui ¸ uj (3.1)
and
ci ¡ cj ¸
p
uiuj ¡ ui (3.2)
Moreover, this equilibrium is unique.
When the ﬁrm selling the most appreciated product has the highest unit cost, existence of the equi-
librium is guaranteed. Equilibrium prices in p1 ¸ p2 are given by:
5This density is a decreasing function of preference intensity for quality, which looks like the observed income distribution

















































2 = u1 + u2 + c1 (3.4)
where ¢ = u2
1 + 4u1(u1 + u2 + c1 ¡ c2). At the equilibrium, ﬁrm 1, which sells the most appreciated
product, selects a higher price than its rival. This Nash equilibrium is weak in the sense that ﬁrm 1
could make the same proﬁt by choosing another price belonging to the interval [p2;+1[. The study of
best response functions reveals why p¤
2 increases with c1 but does not depend on c2. At the equilibrium,
if ﬁrm 1 modiﬁes its price, the local best response of ﬁrm 2 is to modify its own price in the same di-
rection. However, at the equilibrium, ﬁrm 1 is locally insensitive to a small price variation of ﬁrm 2.
This observation recalls practices of pricing imitation like those described by Lazer (1957 p. 130-131),
and particularly the case in which the ﬁrm selling the highest-quality good sets a reference price on the
market. In this context, each other ﬁrm sets the reference price minus a certain amount, which depends
on the quality gap with the benchmark ﬁrm. It will be shown afterwards that this property aﬀects the
attribute choices in the DBA model.
Equilibrium proﬁts are given by:
¦¤
1 = Nu1 ¡ F1 and ¦¤
2 =






When ﬁxed costs are identical F1 = F2, comparison of proﬁts leads to the following condition:
¦¤
1 ¸ ¦¤
2 , c1 ¡ c2 < u1 ¡ u2
Thus, the ﬁrm selling the most appreciated product (u1 > u2) makes the highest proﬁt only if the
diﬀerentiation gap is higher than the cost gap.6
3.2 Perfect equilibrium in the two-stage game
Choices of product speciﬁcation are studied by Laurent (2007b) in a two-stage game with new at-
tributes selection and price competition. In this framework, product imitation is assumed impossible, for
example because the fabrication process of speciﬁc attributes is secret.
In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm i selects speciﬁc attributes for its product, this choice being described by
a synthetic index ai, a positive and continuous variable ai 2 [0;+1[. This index is nothing else but a
simpliﬁed representation of the positioning chosen for the product in order to maximize its producer’s
proﬁt. However, this index provides no information on the precise nature of attributes leading to such
a positioning (a quality diﬀerence, an improvement of brand image, an additional accessory, etc.). The









































1attribute index selected by ﬁrm i aﬀects its unit costs of innovation and the utility obtained by consumers
of product i.
The utility function u : a ! R+ is assumed satisfying u0(ai) > 0 for ﬁnite attribute indices, u00(ai) · 0
and Inada conditions lim
ai!+1
u0(ai) = 0 and lim
ai!0
u0(ai) ! +1. The assumption u0(ai) > 0 means that
an increase in speciﬁc attributes provides with the consumer an additional utility. The marginal utility of
attributes decreases when the attribute index increases implying that u00(ai) · 0. Moreover, oﬀering new
attributes generates a unit cost c : a ! R+, which is constant with the quantity produced but increasing
and convex with the attribute index: c(0) = 0, c0(ai) > 0 and c00(ai) ¸ 0. This standard assumption
(see for example Motta, 1993) means that it is more costly to improve a product which already possesses
many speciﬁc attributes. Exogenous ﬁxed costs are assumed equal F1 = F2.
In the second stage, ﬁrms compete in prices. There exists a price Nash equilibrium if conditions (3.1)
and (3.2) are veriﬁed. Equilibrium prices are given by (3.3) and (3.4) and proﬁts by (3.5).
The game is solved by backward induction. Existence and uniqueness of a perfect Nash equilibrium
are studied. The following proposition presents equilibrium attribute choices:
Proposition 2 (Laurent, 2007b, p 8) When unit costs are endogenous, there exists two perfect
Nash equilibria verifying pi ¸ pj and diﬀering only by the identity of ﬁrms. Firm i chooses the highest
possible index such that u0(ai) = 0. Firm j chooses the index equating the marginal utility of the consumer
and the marginal cost of production: u0(aj) = c0(aj).
Although its unit cost is attribute dependent, the ﬁrm selling the most appreciated product (henceforth
“ﬁrm 1”) selects the highest possible index of attributes. This ﬁnding is a consequence of the weak nature
of the price Nash equilibrium, an eﬀect previously named as “reference price”. Indeed, ﬁrm 1 being the
benchmark on the market, any increase in its unit cost increases its price, which also rises that of its
rival in the same proportion: market position of ﬁrm 1 is not weakened. Finally, ﬁrm 2 chooses a lowest
innovative attribute index. This result can be linked with ﬁrms’ practices and in particular refers to the
“product supremacy” strategy carried out by Venetian tradesman and by the Caterpillar company (see
Rapp, 1975, p 507-508 and Miller, 1990, p 22). As shown in the next section, introducing an imitation
does not keep these ﬁndings unchanged.
Note that the equilibrium embodies the two dimensions of diﬀerentiation, which is horizontal for a
level a¤
2 and vertical for a level a¤
1¡a¤
2. The existence of several forms of diﬀerentiation at the equilibrium
is a new result in itself, not yet observed in multi-dimensional models. Indeed, in these structures, product










































14 Product improvement by innovation and by imitation
This section shows that an imitation may be proﬁtable for a low cost ﬁrm which oﬀers few spe-
ciﬁc attributes. Our assumptions on utility and costs are presented and the existence of equilibrium is
demonstrated in a three-stage game.
4.1 Proﬁtability of imitation and nature of costs
In a framework of diﬀerentiation by attributes, a ﬁrm i can improve the relative attractiveness of its
product by an innovation or by an imitation of its competitor j. As established previously, an innovation
is represented by the development of new speciﬁc attributes, this action increasing ai. But each ﬁrm
can also provide its product with some attributes being so far exclusively oﬀered by a competitor. An
imitation by ﬁrm i reduces aj, the imitated attributes of j being now shared by the products (and thus
ignored by consumers during their choice process). But this action does not modify ai, which depends
only on the speciﬁc attributes of product i.
On markets with diﬀerentiated products, an imitation could however be unproﬁtable, even if this
imitation is costless. When attribute indices vary in the DBA model, comparative statics properties of
equilibrium proﬁts can be explained by the combination of a “diﬀerentiation eﬀect” and an “attractiveness
eﬀect”.7 On the one hand, increasing one of the attribute indices strengthens market diﬀerentiation
(reduces product substitutability), this eﬀect rising ﬁrms’ proﬁts. On the other hand, increasing the
speciﬁc attribute index of product i improves its relative attractiveness: proﬁt of ﬁrm i is increased and
that of ﬁrm j decreased. An imitation from ﬁrm i reduces aj and thus implies a positive attractiveness
eﬀect and a negative diﬀerentiation eﬀect on ¦i, the net eﬀect being ambiguous. The relative weight of
these eﬀects depends both on products’ positioning and on the type of imitation costs.
When costs are exogenous, proposition 3 provides a condition of proﬁtability for an imitation :
Proposition 3 Suppose that ﬁrms’ attribute indices before imitation satisfy a¤
i ¸ a¤
j. Then, the imi-
tation is never proﬁtable for ﬁrm i. Imitation is proﬁtable for ﬁrm j if:
5u(a¤
i) ¡ u(a¤
j) < ci ¡ cj (4.1)
Proof: For ﬁrm i, imitation is proﬁtable if ¦i increases when uj decreases. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 sells the
most appreciated product (u1 > u2). In this case, ﬁrm 1 never increases its quality by imitation because
@¦¤












with x = u1 + u2 + c1 ¡ c2. This derivative equals zero for 5u1 = u2 + c1 ¡ c2, leading to condition 4.1.
Second order condition is:























































¢ + u1)2 ¸ 0
The proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 is thus quasi-convex in u1.¥
This proposition shows that the imitation is never proﬁtable for the ﬁrm selling the most appreciated
product (henceforth ﬁrm 1) because the diﬀerentiation eﬀect is always dominant. Moreover, condition
(4.1) means that ﬁrm 2 is incited to imitation if its unit cost advantage is higher than a threshold, which
depends on its attributes disadvantage. When condition (4.1) holds, the attractiveness eﬀect of imitation
is more signiﬁcant than the diﬀerentiation eﬀect for ﬁrm 2. Consequently, the imitation is performed by
a low quality and low cost ﬁrm (note also that ﬁrm 2 makes a higher proﬁt than ﬁrm 1 before imitation).
This ﬁnding seems empirically relevant because ﬁrms of developing countries frequently imitate their
rivals belonging to developed countries.
These eﬀects are not highlighted in a classical framework of diﬀerentiation by qualities. Indeed, the
only diﬀerentiation eﬀect matters and imitation remains unproﬁtable for the low-quality ﬁrm.8 The DBA
model embodies an additional horizontal diﬀerentiation which strengthens the incentive to imitation.
4.2 Three-stage game with imitation of attributes
Suppose now that innovation and imitation costs are attribute-dependent. In this case, introducing a
product imitation may aﬀect the attribute choices highlighted in the two-stage game of section 3 because
condition (4.1) may be satisﬁed at the equilibrium with endogenous unit costs. That is why a three-stage
game with innovation, imitation and price competition is studied.
In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm i selects a speciﬁc attribute index ai 2 [0;+1[. In the DBA model,
imitation choices are neither modiﬁed by the number of consumers nor by ﬁxed costs values (see condition
4.1): it is assumed thereafter that N = 1 and that F1 = F2. However, the unit cost of ﬁrm i depends on
the attribute index:
Assumption 1: The unit cost function of innovation has a quadratic form: ci = a2
i.
This cost function is also used by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) and by Motta (1993). At
the end of the stage, the attribute index is noted a¤
i.
In the second stage, each ﬁrm observes its competing product and may decide to imitate speciﬁc
attributes belonging to it. We suppose the absence of patent protection. This assumption can be true
in several contexts: protection is not eﬃcient (counterfeit), the patent costs are too high, attributes are
already patented by a provider, etc. An imitation by ﬁrm i decreases the attribute index of product j
above a¤
j. The attribute index of product j after imitation by ﬁrm i is noted b aj(a¤
i;a¤
j): this index veriﬁes












































j. Thus, the level of imitation performed by ﬁrm i is given by a¤
j ¡ b aj(a¤
i;a¤
j) (in the absence













This simplifying assumption is reasonable when some speciﬁc attributes of the ﬁrm selling the most
appreciated product cannot be imitated. Indeed, it is very infrequent to observe an imitation making
disappear all the comparative advantages of the benchmark ﬁrm.
Assumption 3: An imitation of ﬁrm j by ﬁrm i generates a unit cost depending on the imitation level:
b ci = ®(a¤
j ¡ b aj)¯ with 0 · ® · 1 and 0 < ¯ · 2.
Intuitively, the imitation aﬀects the only cost of the imitating ﬁrm. This cost increases with the gap
between the index of j before imitation (ﬁrst stage) and after imitation by i (second stage).9 Imitation
is costless when ® = 0. For these intervals of ® and ¯, it is generally less costly to improve a product by
imitation than by innovation (see Assumption 1), which seems plausible: the average ratio of imitation
to innovation costs is estimated at 0:65 by Mansﬁeld, Schwartz and Wagner (1981). At the end of the
second stage, product i provides consumers with the following utility:
Assumption 4: The utility is a linear function of the attribute index after imitation: ui = b ai.
In the third stage, ﬁrms compete in prices and there exists a price Nash equilibrium if conditions (3.1)
and (3.2) are satisﬁed.
4.3 Existence of the equilibrium with innovation and imitation
As it is inferred from proposition 3, the benchmark ﬁrm never imitates its rival in the second stage:
this preliminary result greatly simpliﬁes the resolution of the three-stage game previously exposed. The
classical backward induction method is employed. For a given couple of attribute indices ( b a1; b a2) in the
third stage, the price subgame is solved by the values (p¤
1( b a1; b a2);p¤
2( b a1; b a2)) such that any deviation is





2)) maximizing ﬁrms’ local proﬁts, knowing the equilibrium index chosen in the ﬁrst
stage. These expressions deﬁne the local perfect Nash equilibrium for all the settings (a1;a2). This
equilibrium concept is relevant in this framework of complex interactions on product attributes because
the most radical deviations cannot reasonably be investigated by ﬁrms.10 The existence of the equilibrim
is established in the following proposition (the ﬁrm choosing the highest index in the ﬁrst stage is called
ﬁrm 1):
9Note that Pepall (1997) uses a quadratic cost function which depends on the quality gap.










































1Proposition 4 Under assumptions 1 to 4, there exists a local perfect Nash equilibrium in the three-
stage game with innovation, imitation and price competition. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 2 selects a¤
2 = 0:5
and ﬁrm 1 a level a¤
1 > a¤
2. In the second stage, ﬁrm 1 never imitates its rival whereas ﬁrm 2 may imitate
its competitor leading to b a1 2 [a¤
2;a¤
1].
Proof: This proof is provided in Appendix 1, section 8.
According to the parameters of the imitation cost, diﬀerent properties may be highlighted at the
equilibrium. These properties depend on the existence of a strategic reaction from the benchmark ﬁrm in
the ﬁrst stage and on the realization of an imitation (or not) in the second stage. By analyzing potential
forms of equilibrium, the following classiﬁcation can be established11:
a) Deterrence Equilibrium. Firm 1 modiﬁes in a strategic way its attribute index a¤
1 in the ﬁrst stage,
this action deterring completely the imitation by ﬁrm 2. No imitation is realized and attribute indices
are not modiﬁed in the second stage ( b a¤
1 = a¤
1).




It is preferable for ﬁrm 1 to accept the imitation in the ﬁrst stage instead of deterring it: consequently,
its attribute index a¤
1 is kept unchanged.
c) Mixed equilibrium. A strategic behaviour of ﬁrm 1 in the ﬁrst stage deters partially the imitation





5 Properties of the equilibrium and nature of imitation costs
In this section, properties of the equilibrium in the three-stage game are studied under diﬀerent cost
assumptions.
5.1 Equilibrium with costless imitation
This case with costless imitation (® = 0) provides a reference point for the study of interactions
between innovation and imitation. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 1 selects strategically its attribute index a¤
1
in order to deter the imitation. Indeed, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 at the end of the second stage is given by
¦¤
1 = b a1: its objective is thus to choose in the ﬁrst stage the value a¤




which will be selected by ﬁrm 2 in the second stage, knowing that ﬁrm 2 chooses a¤
2 = 0:5 in the ﬁrst
stage (Proposition 4). Equilibrium properties are given by the following proposition:
Proposition 5 When ® = 0, ﬁrm 1 selects a¤
1 ¼ 2:45542 and its rival a¤
2 = 0:5 in the ﬁrst stage. In
the second stage, ﬁrm 2 does not imitate ﬁrm 1. A deterrence equilibrium is obtained.
11This classiﬁcation can be linked with that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). These authors study the strategic choice of









































1Proof: This proof is provided in Appendix 2, section 9.1.
In the second stage, the nature of the equilibrium depends on the shape of ¦2( b a1) in the interval
[a¤
2;a1]. Here, when b a1 increases, ¦2 is strictly increasing for low values of a1, strictly quasi-convex for
intermediate values of a1 and strictly decreasing for high values of a1. Consequently, ﬁrm 1 selects the
value a¤
1 ¼ 2:45542 such that ¦2( b a1) is quasi-convex and such that ¦2(a¤
1) = ¦2(a¤
2). Thus, ﬁrm 1 deters
the imitation by decreasing its attribute index compared to the two-stage game, leading to a deterrence
equilibrium.
A decrease in a¤
1 diminishes product diﬀerentiation before imitation and improves the cost compet-
itiveness of ﬁrm 1, these two eﬀects reducing the proﬁtability of an imitation for ﬁrm 2 in the second
stage. Such an imitation would improve the attractiveness of product 2 (increasing ¦2) but it would also
reduce product diﬀerentiation on the market (decreasing ¦2). The strength of these two eﬀects depends
on the degree of diﬀerentiation before imitation: when a1 diminishes, the diﬀerentiation eﬀect becomes
more essential. Moreover, as shown by condition (4.1), imitation is proﬁtable for ﬁrm 2 if and only if
it possesses a unit cost advantage: by reducing a1, ﬁrm 1 also diminishes c1, making the imitation less
proﬁtable.
5.2 Equilibrium with a concave imitation cost
In this section, it is supposed that an imitation entails a positive cost with a concave shape (® > 0
and 0 · ¯ · 1) depending on the imitation size. This assumption may induce ﬁrm 1 to select a higher
attribute index in the ﬁrst stage so as to deter the imitation by increasing the imitation cost beard by its
rival. At the equilibrium, the following property is highlighted:
Proposition 6 When ® > 0 and 0 · ¯ · 1, ﬁrm 1 selects a level a¤
1 in the ﬁrst stage such that ﬁrm
2 never imitates in the second stage. A deterrence equilibrium is realized.
Proof: This proof is provided in Appendix 2, section 9.2.
As previously, the type of equilibrium depends on the shape of ¦2( b a1) in the second stage, which




2 = 0:5) for several representative values of a1.
The same properties are observed for other values of ® > 0 and 0 · ¯ · 1. The equilibrium computed
here is similar to that obtained when imitation is costless: in the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 1 selects a level a¤
1




1 is the maximum level of a1 inciting ﬁrm 2 not to imitate. This level depends
on ® and ¯ and can not be computed explicitly.12
12However, a numerical approximation reveals that a¤
1 increases with ®: the eﬀort required to deter the imitation is lower
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Figure 1: Evolution of ¦2 with b a1 when ® = 0:5 and ¯ = 0:5 for a1 = 2, a1 = 3:5 and a1 = 6.
The concavity of imitation costs plays an important role in the determination of the equilibrium
properties. For such a function, it is very costly for ﬁrm 2 to set oﬀ an imitation of the very ﬁrst
attributes of product 1 because the marginal cost is high. However, after this “starting cost” paid, it is
less and less costly to imitate the other attributes. In this framework, it is more proﬁtable for ﬁrm 1 to
reduce its own attribute index in order to deter the imitation at its beginning.
5.3 Equilibrium with a convex imitation cost
It is assumed now that the imitation cost is convex (® > 0 and 1 < ¯ · 2). The following lemma
identiﬁes the properties of ¦2( b a1) and the potential forms of equilibrium:
Lemma 7 When ® > 0 and 1 < ¯ · 2, ¦2( b a1) has at most two extreme points in the interval ]a¤
2;a¤
1[
according to the value of a¤
1. If there are two extreme points, the ﬁrst one is a minimum and the second
one a maximum. If there is one extreme point, it may be a maximum or a minimum. The three types of
equilibrium may occur: “deterrence”, “accommodation” and “mixed”.
Proof: This proof is provided in Appendix 2, section 9.3.
A simple nested numerical computation is used to determine which equilibrium is eﬀectively obtained.
A grid of size 10¡3 representing every combination of parameters 0 < ® · 1 and 1 < ¯ · 2 is considered.
For each combination, the maximum of ¦2( b a1) is identiﬁed in the interval [0:5;a1] for a continuum of
values of a1. It is assumed that a1 varies into ]0:5;108[ in the ﬁrst stage (the number 108 provides a
ﬁnite approximation of the theoretical upper bound +1). For a pair of parameters (®,¯), the value of a1
(selected by ﬁrm 1) leading to the highest b a¤
1 (selected by ﬁrm 2) determines the type of equilibrium.13
As shown in the following ﬁgure, three distinct areas are identiﬁed14:
13If c a¤
1 = a¤
1 < 108, we have a deterrence equilibrium. If c a¤
1 < a¤
1 = 108, we have an accommodation equilibrium. If
c a¤
1 < c a¤
1 < 108, we have a mixed equilibrium.










































1Figure 2: Typology of equilibria with ® on axis Y and ¯ on axis X. Area 1: “mixed”. Area 2: “accommo-
dation”. Area 3: “deterrence”.
These ﬁndings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Suppose that the imitation cost is convex: ® > 0 and 1 < ¯ · 2. When ¯ is high, the
equilibrium is characterized by an accommodation of ﬁrm 1. When ¯ is low and ® low, the equilibrium
is characterized by an imitation deterrence of ﬁrm 2 by ﬁrm 1. When ¯ is low and ® high, a mixed
equilibrium occurs.
The three possible settings are now interpreted more precisely by representing the evolution of ¦2( b a1)
for diﬀerent values of a1. The special case of ® = 0:4 is taken as an example because the three types
of equilibrium are observed according to the threshold ¯ selected (we consider ¯ = 1:1, ¯ = 1:45 and
¯ = 1:6).
First, when ® and ¯ are low, the deterrence equilibrium computed is similar to that highlighted with
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Figure 3: Evolution of¦2 with b a1 when ® = 0:4 and ¯ = 1:1 for a1 = 2, a1 = 4:5, a1 = 7 and a1 = 108.
In the second stage, ﬁrm 2 selects either a maximum imitation b a¤
1 = a¤
2 = 0:5 (for “high” values of a1)
or no imitation b a¤




2) (in this example, a¤









































1deterrence (no imitation). This strategic behavior remains possible because imitation costs are weakly
convex.
Second, when ¯ is high (imitation costs are strongly convex), the evolution of ¦2( b a1) is represented
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Figure 4: Evolution of¦2 with b a1 when ® = 0:4 and ¯ = 1:6 for a1 = 4:7, a1 = 15, a1 = 500 and a1 = 108
In the second stage, ﬁrm 2 may select a partial imitation a¤
2 < b a¤
1 < a¤
1 (for “quite low ” or “high” values
of a1, when the proﬁt is maximum at the second extreme point), a maximum imitation b a¤
1 = a¤
2 = 0:5 (for
“intermediate” values of a1) or no imitation b a¤
1 = a1 (for “very low” values of a1). In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm
1 knows that the size of imitation chosen by ﬁrm 2 remains low, even if a high a1 is selected. This choice
being the most proﬁtable, an accommodation equilibrium occurs in which b a¤
1 < a¤
1 = 108. The existence
of such an equilibrium can be linked with the shape of the imitation cost. When this cost is strongly
convex, a small imitation is not very costly for ﬁrm 2 and a complete deterrence strategy requires a high
proﬁt cut for ﬁrm 1. However, increasing the size of imitation is more and more costly for ﬁrm 2 and its
eﬀective imitation remains always moderate, even if a1 is very high. Consequently, it is more proﬁtable
for ﬁrm 1 to allow this imitation instead of deterring it.
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Figure 5: Evolution de¦2 with b a1 when ® = 0:4 and ¯ = 1:45 for a1 = 2, a1 = 4, a1 = 7:5 and a1 = 108.
In the second stage, ﬁrm 2 may select a maximum imitation b a¤
1 = a¤
2 = 0:5 (for “high” values of a1), a
partial imitation a¤
2 < b a¤
1 < a¤
1 (for “intermediate” values of a1, when the proﬁt is maximum at the second
extreme point) or no imitation b a¤
1 = a1 (for “low” values of a1). In the ﬁrst stage, the most proﬁtable









































1mixed equilibrium occurs b a¤
1 < a¤
1 < 108 (in this example, a¤
1 ¼ 7:535). The complete deterrence cannot
be an equilibrium: starting from such a setting, an increase in a1 also increases b a1, even if a partial
imitation is done by ﬁrm 2. This equilibrium can be explained by the form of the imitation cost: as the
degree of cost convexity (¯) is quite low, a deterrence strategy is useful for ﬁrm 1 in order to avoid a
maximum imitation. However, as the absolute level of imitation cost (®) is high, a complete deterrence
is not required and a partial imitation is accepted by ﬁrm 1.
5.4 Additional comments
The strategic decrease of attribute indices highlighted in the DBA model can be linked with observed
behaviours of some benchmark ﬁrms. At the beginning of the 1980’s, the systematic product improvement
strategy carried out by the Caterpillar company strongly reduces its cost competitiveness. This weakness
incited its rival Komatsu to make proﬁtable product imitations while keeping moderate prices.15 To avoid
the bankruptcy, “CEO George Schaefer initiated a $1.8 billion “Plant with a Future” program. He began
to implement a speedy, ﬂexible manufacturing system that is already cutting the costs of some operations
by 20 percent. The ﬁrm also shut down ineﬃcient plants and slashed payrolls by 30 percent” (Miller,
1990, p 226). Afterwards, Komatsu gave up progressively its imitation strategy and chooses to endow its
product with new attributes and services.
Compared to the two-stage game studied in section 3.2, introducing an imitation phase reduces the
vertical dimension of diﬀerentiation at the equilibrium. Equilibrium values are closer of those computed
in papers studying quality choices (see for example Motta, 1993). It is also meaningful to study the
evolution of attribute indices before and after imitation when the cost parameters ® and ¯ vary. When
the level of imitation cost (®) increases, the strategic index reduction required to deter the imitation is
lower for the leader. The index after imitation b a1 increases with ®, in accordance with the intuition.
Moreover, observe that no eﬀective imitation is performed when imitation costs are null whereas it is not
true when imitation costs are positive and convex. To explain this result, note that a complete deterrence
is proﬁtable for the benchmark ﬁrm only if the degree of convexity ¯ of imitation cost is relatively low.
6 Conclusion
When demand functions are described by the DBA duopoly, a three-stage game with innovation,
imitation and price competition is studied in this work. Existence of a perfect Nash equilibrium is
demonstrated when endogenous unit costs of innovation and imitation are considered. It is shown that a
product imitation is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm selling the less appreciated product if its unit cost is suﬃciently
low. On the contrary, an imitation is never proﬁtable for the benchmark ﬁrm. Moreover, this paper
highlights a new strategic behaviour of imitation deterrence: the benchmark ﬁrm decreases its attribute
index to diminish product diﬀerentiation and improve its cost competitiveness, reducing the proﬁtability
15“Cat’s obsession with quality had boosted expenses to the point where it could no longer compete. Its production









































1of imitation for its rival.
Three types of equilibrium are distinguished, according to the level and the degree of convexity of
imitation costs. When imitation costs are null or concave, a deterrence equilibrium occurs: the strategic
decrease of attribute index completely deters the imitation. When imitation costs are strongly convex, the
imitation size remains so moderate that the benchmark ﬁrm accepts it without modifying its attribute
index: an accommodation equilibrium occurs. Finally, when imitation costs are weakly convex (but
suﬃciently high), we observe a mixed equilibrium with partial deterrence and partial accommodation.
The DBA framework thus provides new insights for the study of interactions between product innovation
and imitation.
Such a deterrence action diﬀers of that obtained in Pepall and Richards (1994): the leader ﬁrm is
not incited to over-invest in innovation in order to increase the imitation cost of its competitor. These
two approaches are complementary because diﬀerent cost functions are employed (endogenous unit/ﬁxed
costs) but the diﬀerentiation structure used here also introduces new eﬀects, which explain the diﬀerent
ﬁndings observed. However, our results can be linked with the literature on entry deterrence. Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984) showed that an incumbent may under-invest in advertising in the current period to
threat a rival of a future advertising war if it enters on the market (the “lean and hungry look”).
The impact of imitation (eﬀective or deterred) on welfare is a priori ambiguous and should be studied
more precisely. A deterrence action reduces prices (lower costs and less diﬀerentiation on the market) but
also the product innovation. An eﬀective imitation increases the cost of the imitating ﬁrm but also turn
speciﬁc attributes into shared attributes, a positive eﬀect on consumer surplus. Finally, a global welfare
study must include the impact of imitation on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. A more accurate analysis requires deﬁning
a consumer surplus function associated to the DBA model, what is currently not a settled question.
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8 Appendix 1: Existence of the perfect Nash equilibrium
This section provides the proof of proposition 4. The three-stage game is solved by backward induction.
In the last stage, equilibrium prices are given by (3.3) and (3.4).
In the second stage, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is independent of a2 (see equation 3.5) and ﬁrm 1 never imitates
ﬁrm 2. Consequently, the attribute index at the end of the second stage b a2 is always equal to that chosen
by ﬁrm 2 in the ﬁrst stage. As b a2 = a¤
2, the proﬁt of 2 only depends on a¤
2 and on the attribute indices of
ﬁrm 1 before imitation a¤
1 and after imitation b a1. For the utility and unit costs functions employed, the
proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 in the second stage is:
¦2( b a1) =
(
p
¢ ¡ b a1)x
p
¢ + b a1
(8.1)
with ¢ = b a2
1 + 4 b a1x and x = b a1 + a¤
2 + (a¤
1)2 ¡ (a¤
2)2 ¡ b c2(a¤
1; b a1).
Firm 2 selects a level b a1 in the interval [a¤
2;a¤
1]: the shape of ¦2( b a1) in this interval depends on the
value a¤
1 chosen by ﬁrm 1 in the ﬁrst stage and on the imitation cost parameters. The ﬁrst derivative of




4x b a1[( b a1 +
p












1 ¡ b a1)¯¡1
Thus, any extreme point of ¦2 is determined by the following ﬁrst order condition:
( b a1 +
p
¢)(1 ¡ b c0
2) ¡ x = 0 (8.3)
Zero, one or several extreme points may exists in the interval [a¤
2;a¤
1]. The nature of an extreme point















































@ c a1 =0
=
4x b a1[(2x + 2 b a1 b c0
2 + 3 b a1)(1 ¡ b c0
2) ¡
p












= ®¯(¯ ¡ 1)(a¤
1 ¡ b a1)¯¡2
When b c00
2 < 0, any extreme point is necessarily a minimum but when b c00
2 > 0, the sign of the second
derivative is unknown. However, as by deﬁnition b a1(a¤
1;a¤
2) belongs to the constrained interval [a¤
2;a¤
1], it
is not required knowing the exact level of imitation to demonstrate the existence of a local perfect Nash
equilibrium. A unique value b a1 maximizing ¦2( b a1) can always be computed. Consequently, the existence
can be demonstrated simply by extending the proof used in the two-stage game with innovation and price
competition (Laurent, 2007b, p 20).
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 2 knows that ﬁrm 1 will not imitate its product in the second stage. Its attribute
choice is thus identical to that highlighted in the two-stage game: u0(ac
2) = c0(ac
2). For the particular
functions employed here, equilibrium values are given by a¤
2 = 0:5, u2 = 0:5 and c2 = 0:25.
When there is no imitation, the two-stage game analysis concludes that ﬁrm 1 selects the highest index
a¤
1 ! +1. But when the threat of imitation is anticipated, proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is given by ¦1 = b a1(a¤
1;a¤
2).
This proﬁt could be maximized for a lower value of a1 than in the two-stage game because of the deter-
rence imitation eﬀect. As each attribute index before imitation a1 leads to a unique index after imitation
a¤
1, the equilibrium value in the ﬁrst stage a¤
1 is uniquely deﬁned.
Consequently, the existence of unique perfect Nash equilibrium is established. ¥
9 Appendix 2: equilibrium properties and nature of costs
9.1 Equilibrium with a costless imitation
As it is of common knowledge that a¤
2 = 0:5, the study of condition (8.3) in the second stage shows
that ¦2( b a1) has a unique extreme point given by equation e b a1 = (1=5)a¤2
1 + 1=20. The second order
condition (8.4) reveals that this point is a minimum but it can be inside or outside the interval [a¤
2;a¤
1].
Following an increase in b a1, ¦2 strictly increases when e b a1 · a¤
2 , a¤
1 · 1:5, strictly decreases when
e b a1 ¸ a¤
1 , a¤
1 ¸ 2:5 +
p
6 and is quasi-convex when 1:5 · a¤
1 · 2:5 +
p
6.
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 1 selects its index before imitation a¤
1 in order to maximize the remaining level
after imitation b a1. When a¤





6, ﬁrm 2 does not imitate if ¦2(a¤
2) · ¦2(a¤
1) and decides to imitate ( b a1 = a¤






6, ﬁrm 2 always imitates, leading to b a1 = a¤
2. Consequently, the value
of a¤
1 maximizing the index b a1 belongs to the interval [1:5;2:5 +
p













































19.2 Equilibrium with a concave imitation cost
This section provides the proof of proposition 6, which is carried out in two steps. First, it is shown
that ¦2( b a1) is either strictly increasing or strictly quasi-convex in the interval [a¤
2;a¤
1] according to the
value of a¤
1. Second, this property is used to eliminate the “mixed” and “accommodation” forms of potential
equilibria.
The ﬁrst order condition (8.3) can be rewritten as an equality f( b a1) ¡ g( b a1) = 0 where functions f
and g are deﬁned by:
f( b a1) =
p
¢(1 ¡ b c0
2) ¡ x (9.1)
g( b a1) = b a1(b c0
2 ¡ 1) ¡ x (9.2)
with ¢ = b a2
1 + 4 b a1x and x = b a1 + a¤
2 + (a¤
1)2 ¡ (a¤
2)2 ¡ b c2.
By keeping in mind that b c0
2 < 0 and b c00




= ¡1 + b c0
2 + b a1 b c00




(1 ¡ b c0
2)[ b a1 + 2x + 2 b a1(1 ¡ b c0
2) ¡
p




The derivative in (9:4) is always positive because b a1+2x >
p
¢ (it can be checked by squaring the two
sides of the equality). Thus, when b a1 increases, function f also increases whereas function g decreases.
Consequently, ¦2( b a1) possesses at most a unique extreme point in the interval [a¤
2;a¤
1]: the proﬁt function
may be strictly increasing, strictly decreasing or quasi-convex. But the slope of ¦2 is always positive
when b a1 ! a1. Indeed, limc a1!a1 b c0
2 ! ¡1, implying limc a1!a1 f( b a1) ! +1 and limc a1!a1 g( b a1) ! ¡1.
This property is true whatever the value of a1. Consequently ¦2( b a1) is either strictly increasing or strictly
quasi-convex in the interval.
According to a¤
1, ﬁrm 2 selects either b a1 = a¤
1 (deterrence equilibrium with no imitation) or b a1 = a¤
2
(accommodation equilibrium with maximum imitation) in the second stage, excluding the possibility of
a mixed equilibrium. However, this accommodation equilibrium never occurs because ﬁrm 1 can always
deter the imitation by reducing a1 in the ﬁrst stage. This aﬃrmation is demonstrated by observing that
¦2 strictly increases with b a1 in [0:5;a1] when a1 ! 0:5 (see the previous paragraph). Consequently, there
exists at least a value a¤
1 > a¤
2 leading to a deterrence equilibrium with b a1 = a¤
1 (which is more proﬁtable
than an accommodation equilibrium for ﬁrm 1).¥
9.3 Equilibrium with a convex imitation cost
This section provides the proof of lemma 7. When the imitation cost is convex, it is shown that ¦2( b a1)
possesses zero, one or two extreme points in the interval [a¤
2;a¤










































1As in section 9.2, the ﬁrst order condition (8.3) is rewritten as an equality f( b a1) ¡ g( b a1) = 0 where
functions f and g are deﬁned by equations (9.1) and (9.2). By keeping in mind that b c0
2 < 0 and b c00
2 > 0,
signs of ﬁrst derivatives (equations 9.3 and 9.4) are undetermined. That is why the second derivatives of






= ¡®¯(¯ ¡ 1)(¯ ¡ 2)(a¤
1 ¡ b a1)¯¡3 > 0



















2 + (1 ¡ b c0
2)h( b a1) (9.5)
with
h( b a1) =
b a1( b a1 + 4x)[1 + 4(1 ¡ b c0
2) ¡ 2 b a1 b c00




and again ¢ = b a2
1 + 4 b a1x and x = b a1 + a¤
2 + (a¤
1)2 ¡ (a¤
2)2 ¡ b c2.
It can be proven that f00( b a1) < 0 if it is demonstrated that h( b a1) · 0. By simplifying function h, we
ﬁnd:
h( b a1) =








Consequently, function f is concave (monotonic or quasi-concave).







@ c a1 =0
= 2b c00
2 + b a1c c000
2 > 0
Thus, function g is convex (monotonic or quasi-convex). There are at most two intersections between
the concave function f and the convex function g in the interval ]0:5;a¤
1[ and ¦2 possesses at most two
extreme points. If there is one extreme point, this point can be a maximum or a minimum. If there are
two extreme points, the ﬁrst one is necessarily a minimum and the second one a maximum. Finally, the
maximum of ¦2( b a1) can be reached either at a bound of the interval (“deterrence” or “accommodation”
equilibria) or inside the interval (“mixed” equilibrium) and the three types of equilibrium may occur.¥
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